

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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The Probability of an Eventual Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement

1. The secret and constant tendencies of the Yugoslav Communists are to make peace with Moscow. Since the end of last year, these tendencies have become more obvious. For example, in January 1953, Kardelj spoke in the following terms to an intimate Party gathering:

"The West is becoming stronger; it is therefore necessary to unite the progressive forces of the world. We Yugoslavs shall improve our relations with Moscow during the very year, and bring them back as they were before. The basis of present day international policy is to tie the capitalist countries to the East, especially the Far East. The capitalists need the hungry markets of the East, and we need the valuable productive forces of Western Europe."

2. The higher circles of the Communist Party are convinced that Communism cannot achieve its goal without highly developed industrial capacities, capable of mass production; therefore Communist regimes need the industry of Western Europe. It is in this light that Kardelj's statement should be viewed.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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3. Indications of the insincere policy of Yugoslav Communists:
  - a. Constant avoidance of opportunities to join the Atlantic Pact;
  - b. Tito's return to the Soviet position on the Trieste question;
  - c. Information that Kardelj, without consulting Tito, began pourparlers with Moscow.
4. As a consequence of these developments there are today the following initial rapprochements:
  - a. The success of the Danubian Conference;<sup>1</sup>
  - b. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Belgrade;
  - c. The issuance of the suspicious declaration of the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;<sup>2</sup>
  - d. The resurgence of Cominformist spirit among orthodox Communists in Belgrade.
5. Since the United States has recently, and judiciously, begun to view Yugoslav policies more critically and since Yugoslavia's relations with the Socialist International are not progressing speedily enough, the Yugoslav leaders have once again turned their eyes toward Moscow. If Moscow does not raise embarrassing questions about Party leaders and their past activities, [ ] they would immediately return to Moscow's embrace. Tito however, may be objectionable to Moscow. This is why Tito, even today, shows a more hostile attitude toward Moscow.

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Differences between Tito and Kardelj

6. Although knowledge of differences between the views of Tito and Kardelj is largely confined to higher Party circles, these differences do exist and can be summarized by the following:
  - a. Since the very beginning of the quarrel with Moscow, Kardelj has not seen eye to eye with Tito; he adjusted his position only because he feared liquidation.
  - b. They disagreed over the employment of Yugoslav emigres in the West. Kardelj regarded every Yugoslav mission abroad as a revolutionary cell and insisted that Communists lead the emigre organizations. If this proved impossible, Kardelj felt it better to have no organization at all. Tito, on the contrary, wanted to assemble men in emigre organizations without reference to their political orientation, as long as they respected the new Yugoslav regime.

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14. Soviet imperialism is explained by the Party in the following manner: "Russian imperialism actually exists; however, it is a means not a goal. It is the striking nucleus of the future world revolution. As a matter of principle a strong, indestructible force must be created as a rallying point around which all the countries in which progressive forces have triumphed will assemble. The countries gathered around this rallying force will be able to develop and strengthen themselves against the reaction. The nucleus shall act as an arbitrating force in the harmonization of the new Communist order, which is our final aim."

Alignment of Ideological Groups within the Party

15. Following the termination of the Sixth Party Congress in November 1953, some opposition from certain Communists appeared. This incited Tito to rely more heavily on his "trusted old guard", the so-called first fighters of the resistance period. The group can be divided into three categories:
- a. Soviet pupils educated in Moscow. These are the most influential individuals but they are few in number.
  - b. Opportunists and career people. These men are not hard-core Communists, but they enjoy good career prospects under the Tito regime. Very few of this group have a formal education or high moral standards; but they have all proved their loyalty to the Party. This group is the largest and is thought to be the main pillar of the Party.
  - c. Idealists, who are fanatically devoted to the Party and to Tito. Among this group are men who have begun to detect the mistakes of Lenin concerning Socialism and are consequently anxious to return to social democracy, that is the Socialist International. Like the first group, this category is small in number.
16. Not a single member of the above groups has the least interest in a true democratic regime; all are professional revolutionaries, and adherents of Marxist ideologies. All their activities are subordinated to the question of whether their work or decisions are consistent with Marxism; there is no concern over whether it is good for the general populace.

Comments:

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1. Probably a reference to the agreement reached with Rumania on administration of the Iron Gates sector of the Danube on 15 May 1953.
2. Possibly a reference to public statement by Koca Popovic on 26 May in which he voiced a desire for improved relations with the USSR.

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